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Americans more vehemently oppose mandatory school desegre-
gation than almost all other policies recently advanced by the fed-
eral government. The degree of fury, fear, and physical violence
attendant upon "forced busing" seems all out of proportion to the
actual, rather simple, fact of assigning and transporting children
away from one public school and to another. School desegregation
therefore provides an invaluable window for looking through the
opaque wall of conventional civilities into the complex interior of
American race relations.
Why do so many white parents oppose mandatory school desegre-
gation so strongly? The answer seems obvious, at first glance - as
JesseJackson quips, "It's not the bus, it's us." Whites dislike deseg-
regated schools because they dislike blacks. But racism is both too
strong and too weak an explanation for white opposition to school
desegregation policies. It is too strong because it does not account
for the fact that many whites differentiate among blacks. Some anti-
busers, after all, eagerly enroll their children in racially mixed mag-
* Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University. My thanks to the
National Academy of Education's Spencer Foundation Fellowship for supporting this
research, and to Deborah Baumgold, C. Anthony Broh, Elizabeth Bussiere, Thomas
Cavanagh, Amy Gutmann, Jane Mansbridge, David Pavelchek, Paul Peterson, and Alan
Wertheimer for their very helpful comments on various drafts of the paper.
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net schools.' Conversely, Jackson's answer is too weak because it
does not fully explain why some whites are prejudiced. Residents of
Charlestown and Canarsie do not simply dislike blacks; they dislike
blacks because, with school desegregation, " 'the three R's will be
turned to Riot, Rape, and Robbery,' " or because they think of
blacks as " 'the welfare lady splurging' " or " 'nonproductive and
counter-productive leeches.' "2
These critics are more astute than many policy makers or analysts.
Tomato-throwing "Townies ' 3 are pointing out what political lead-
ers often obscure - that the problem of race is the problem of class
and power as well. Desegregation policies are so controversial be-
cause they bring to the surface not only the issue of racial discrimi-
nation but also the facts of class and power inequalities.
School desegregation is not unique in this regard; policies of af-
firmative action in employment and programs to disperse public
housing in suburbs also raise questions of class and power as well as
race. Citizens who realize that complexity act accordingly. White
anti-busers who enroll their children in magnet schools are distin-
guishing, implicitly, between middle class and poor blacks. Whites
who oppose "reverse discrimination" but endorse "equal opportu-
nity" are denying, implicitly, that whiteness gives undue economic
advantages. Whites who resist black "encroachment" on their
neighborhood but support "open housing" are fighting, implicitly,
for some modicum of control over their environment.
If the problem of race in America is really a problem of cumula-
tive inequalities of race, class, and power, Americans face a conflict
between our circumstances and our most cherished political values.
To posit the facts of cumulative inequalities against the ideals of lib-
eral democracy is to pose an extraordinarily difficult problem: the
United States can only achieve the promige of liberal democracy for
all by challenging the practice of liberal democracy for some.4
Defining these concepts permits clearer specification of the con-
flict. A liberal democracy is a society designed to guarantee its mem-
1. See, e.g., J. SCHOFIELD, BLACK AND WHITE IN SCHOOL (1982).
2. J. A. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND 259 (1985); J. REIDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND
ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM 96, 101 (1985). These books, along withJ.
SCHOFIELD, supra note 1, are among the best recent ethnographic studies of the traumas
of contemporary American race relations.
3. See J. A. LUKAs, supra note 2, at 262.
4. Gunnar Myrdal, in his classic G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1944), described part of the problem I am con-
cerned with. He focused on the disjunction between whites' discriminatory practices
and their belief in the American Creed of equality and individualism. However,
although he described class and power inequities in great detail, he did not incorporate
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bers' right to choose to live the way they wish. Its basic tenets are
individualism, popular sovereignty and political equality (usually de-
fined as majority rule), equal opportunity to pursue one's goals, the
rights of protection of self and property against unwarranted inter-
ference, and only as much government as is needed to ensure these
freedoms and rights. The dimension of race is a social and psycho-
logical phenomenon. People identify themselves and others as
"black" or "white," 5 and they hold views and take actions as a con-
sequence of that identification. Whether races are biologically dis-
tinct is immaterial; what matters is that, to a greater or lesser
degree, people perceive blacks and whites differently and act
accordingly.
The dimension of class refers to the fact of economic stratification.
Classes are not necessarily fixed or inherently conflicting. But class
origins affect people's position in the economic structure which in
turn affects their work, family, social life, and expectations.
The dimension of power refers to political control. It implies at
least having some say over an organization's or other people's ac-
tions, and at most determining those actions. "Organizations and
other people" are typically governmental officials and agencies, but
they may be so-called private entities such as corporations, founda-
tions, or social clubs.
These definitions, sketchy as they are, show more specifically how
the ideal of liberal democracy clashes with the facts of cumulative
inequalities of race, class, and power. Racial prejudice and discrimi-
nation violate our belief in individualism and our guarantee of indi-
vidual rights. A class structure violates equality of opportunity.
Power disparities vitiate (although they do not logically contradict)
popular sovereignty and political equality. Combining all three ine-
qualities leaves little of the promise of liberal democracy for poor
and powerless blacks. But efforts to eliminate these cumulative ine-
all three dimensions of inequality into his understanding of the American dilemma.
Thus, from my perspective his argument is correct but incomplete.
Note that my criticism of Myrdal in this paper differs from the one offered inJ. HOCH-
SCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA (1984). That book concentrated on the unlikely
prospects for resolving America's race problem by relying on conventional means of
policymaking and preferred modes of policy choice. Here I am concentrating on the
reasons for those unlikely prospects.
5. For the sake of keeping complexity manageable, I am ignoring ethnic or racial
groups other than blacks and whites. This exclusion is substantively defensible for two
reasons: 1) the histories of Asians and Hispanics in the United States are distinctive and
deserve separate treatment; and 2) the history of problems between blacks and whites
eclipses the problems of integrating successive waves of non-Anglo immigrants. See, e.g.,
Jencks, Affirmative Action for Blacks, 28 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 731, 743-47 (1985).
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qualities conflict with the remaining features of liberal democracy -
protection of individual and property rights, majority rule, and min-
imal governmental interference in private lives.
This normative problem has an equally unsettling policy dimen-
sion. Programs that address only one of the three inequalities are
too weak and simplistic to extend the promises of liberal democracy
to all Americans. Only programs that attack all three at once can
fully succeed. But recent history shows that policies ranging wide
enough to encompass all three inequalities run into broad and deep
opposition. What we can do will not suffice; what will suffice, we
cannot do.
Posed in so stark a fashion, the normative problem and its attend-
ant policy dilemma seem insoluble. Perhaps they are. Nevertheless,
we could at least take more action than we have so far to lessen the
distance from the top to the bottom of each dimension of inequality,
and to loosen the links among the three dimensions. Whether our
nation has the policy skill and political will to find and sustain even
these partial reforms, however, remains to be seen.
This article explores that set of propositions by demonstrating the
cumulative nature of race, class, and power inequalities, and by ex-
amining in some detail their implications for the case of school
desegregation. It then looks briefly at affirmative action in employ-
ment and at residential desegregation through public housing in or-
der to suggest that the analysis extends beyond school de-
segregation. Finally, it raises some possibilities for reform that ad-
dress class and power as well as racial inequalities.
I. Cumulative Inequalities of Race, Class, and Power
Consider racial discrimination, the most basic dimension of the
cumulative inequalities. Survey data show clearly that whites believe
and profess to be glad that blacks are no longer second-class
citizens. They perceive that prejudice is declining, they reject preju-
dice themselves, and they think that our society is becoming more
(and sufficiently) integrated. Whites are so sanguine about contem-
porary race relations that twice as many whites attribute the continu-
ing disadvantaged state of blacks to personal faults as to
discrimination. 6
6. See Lewis & Schneider, Black Voting, Bloc Voting, and the Democrats, 6 PUBLIC OPINION
12 (1983); Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, A STUDY OF ATrITUDES TOWARD RACIAL AND
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND TOWARD WOMEN 21, 28-34, 45-58 (1978); CBS/N.Y. TIMES
POLL, THE KERNER COMMISSION - TEN YEARS LATER 3 (Feb. 1978); H. SCHUMAN, C.
STEEH, & L. BOBO, RACIAL ATrITUDES IN AMERICA chs. 3, 4 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
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Many blacks, however, see the same society in an entirely different
light. Blacks are not optimistic about their long-term prospects,
since they perceive lingering prejudice and persisting discrimina-
tion.7 And they are, at least in part, correct. Whites do continue to
express racial prejudice,8 and their enthusiasm for implementing
desegregation policies is much lower than their support for general
principles of integration.9 Wage differentials attributable to nothing
but race remain high,' 0 and blacks are much more likely to become
and remain unemployed than whites.'1 Blacks continue to receive
poorer education and show fewer positive results of schooling. 12
Residential segregation is declining, but slowly.' 3
Next, consider the effect of class differences on how much preju-
dice whites express and how much discrimination blacks experience.
One survey, for example, found that even among strongly liberal
whites, a majority were willing to desegregate professions, neigh-
borhoods, and workplaces only with middle class blacks. 14 Poor
black schools have traditionally received fewer funds and less exper-
ienced teachers than either poor white or wealthier black schools.' 5
The difference in achievement test scores between poor black stu-
dents and poor students of other races is greater than the corre-
sponding difference among wealthy students.' 6
SCHUMAN]; T. CAVANAGH, INSIDE BLACK AMERICA: THE MESSAGE OF THE BLACK VOTE IN
THE 1984 ELECTIONS (1985). See generally P. CONVERSE, J. DOTSON, W. HOAG & W. Mc-
GEE III, AMERICAN SOCIAL ATITrUDES DATA SOURCEBOOK: 1947-1978, at 55-98 (1980);
Kluegel & Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 518 (1982).
7. See Lewis & Schneider, supra note 6; CBS NEws/ N.Y. TIMES POLL, supra note 6, at
3, 6, 11; Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, supra note 6, at 2-4; SCHUMAN, supra note 6. See
generally P. CONVERSE, supra note 6.
8. See Kluegel & Smith, supra note 6, at 522-24; CBS NEWs/N.Y. TIMES POLL, supra
note 6, at 3; Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, supra note 6, at 4-5, 14-19; Smith & Demp-
sey, The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Preudice, 47 PUB. OPINION Q 584 (1983); SCHU-
MAN, supra note 6. See generally P. CONVERSE, supra note 6.
9. See T. CAVANAGH, supra note 6.
10. R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP? 55-81 (1984). This book
is probably the best recent comparison using aggregate data of changes in the economic,
educational, and demographic statuses of the two races.
11. M. REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 34 (1981);
O'Hare, Unemployment: A Look Behind the Numbers, 11 Focus 5 (1983).
12. See COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, EQUALITY AND EXCELLENCE: THE
EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS 11-40 (1985) for extensive and varied sup-
porting data.
13. M. WHITE, NEIGHBORHOODS AND RESIDENTIAL DIFFERENTIATION ch. 6 (forthcom-
ing 1986).
14. J. CADrFZ, WHITE LIBERALS IN TRANSITION 78 (1976).
15. Baron, Race and Status in School Spending, 6 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1971); L.
RUBIN, BUSING AND BACKLASH 45 (1972).
16. Berryman, Integrating the Sciences, 17 NEW PERSP. 20 (1985); COLLEGE ENTRANCE
EXAMINATION BOARD, PROFILES, COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS, 1984, at 37, 47, 57, 76
(1985).
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Most important, although well-off black couples earn about as
much as their white counterparts, poverty among blacks is more
widespread and deeper than poverty among whites. Forty-six per-
cent of black children are poor, and half of poor black children live
below 50 percent of the poverty line. By comparison, only 17 per-
cent of white children are poor, of whom 40 percent live below 50
percent of the poverty line.' 7 More generally, the poorest fifth of
black families have a smaller share of total black income than the
poorest fifth of white families have of total white income, and the
wealthiest 20 percent of black families earn more of black income
than the corresponding percentage of whites earn of white income.
Black incomes, but not white incomes, have become slightly more
unequal since World War 11.18
Finally, consider how inequalities of power contribute to the first
two dimensions of inequality. The past few decades have brought a
dramatic increase in the number of black elected officials - raising,
however, the number of blacks in office from virtually nonexistent to
a miniscule 1.2 percent of all elected officials.19 Many whites ad-
mired Jesse Jackson's personal qualities,20 but neither voters nor
political institutions treated him as a serious contender for the Dem-
ocratic nomination. 2' Three-quarters of whites profess willingness
to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate, but 16 percent
still reject the idea out of hand; at least in local elections involving
black candidates, some supporters give the socially desirable answer
on a survey but vote differently, and "the 'undecided' vote breaks
overwhelmingly for a white." 22 Thus, "black political candidates
must generally rely upon black voters to secure and retain office." 23
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POP-
ULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1983, P-60, No. 147, at 5, 25, 26 (1984).
18. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSE-
HOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1983, P-60, No. 146, at 49-50
(1985).
19. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS (1985); Rich,
Blacks, Despite Gains, Hold Few Elective Posts, Washington Post, June 9, 1985, at A5, col. 3.
20. T. CAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 30-33.
21. See T. CAVANAGH & L. FOSTER, JESSE JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN: THE PRIMARIES AND
THE CAUCUSES 9-11 (1984); C. Anthony Broh, A Horse of a Different Color 2, 34-40
(Apr. 30, 1985) (paper presented at Joint Center for Political Studies Conference, Wash-
ington, D.C.); William Crotty, The Presidential Nominating Process and Minority Can-
didates 13 (Apr. 30, 1985) (paper presented at Joint Center for Political Studies
Conference, Washington D.C.).
22. T. CAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 64.
23. T. Cavanagh, Black Mobilization and Partisanship: 1984 and Beyond 7 (Apr. 30,
1985) (paper presented at Joint Center For Political Studies Conference, Washington
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Structural reasons also suggest that the number of black elected
officials will remain disappointingly low. Blacks usually attain polit-
ical office either because district boundaries are redrawn to concen-
trate black voters, because many blacks register and vote for the first
time, or because blacks are fairly wealthy compared to the whites in
that district.2 4 Both simple arithmetic and the fact of greater black
poverty suggest that these three mechanisms for increasing black
political power have natural limits.
Even winning elections is only a partial victory. Blacks usually at-
tain mayoral and city council positions either in heavily black cities
or rural areas that are increasingly poor and demoralized, or in
largely white cities and suburbs where they depend on white constit-
uents acutely sensitive to the distribution of excessive benefits to
groups other than themselves. The constraints in the two cases are
different, but equally powerful.2 5 Thus black elected officials are
able to do little to change the lives of their black constituents.2 6
In short, despite clear progress in recent decades on all three
fronts, the cumulation of race, class, and power inequalities contin-
ues to deny the promises of liberal democracy to some Americans.
Frederick Douglass' words are more anachronistic in their rhetoric
than in their meaning: "The rich inheritance of justice, liberty,
prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared
by you, not by me. . . . To drag a man in fetters into the grand
illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joy-
ous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony." 27
24. T. CAVANAGH & D. STOCKTON, supra note 23, at 20-21; Karnig, Black Resources and
City Council Representation, 41J. POL. 134 (1979); Karnig, Black Representation on City Coun-
ciLs, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223 (1976).
25. See Reed, Dynamics of Urban Racial Transition and Afro-American Politics 11-
12, 17-20 (June 20, 1984) (paper presented at City University of New York Symposium);
Stone, Race, Power, and Political Change 29-35 (Sept. 1, 1983) (paper presented at
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL); Sonenshein,
Bradley's People: Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles 14-17, 21-24 (Sept. 1, 1985)
(paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orle-
ans, LA); Bullock, The Election of Blacks in the South: Preconditions and Consequences, 19 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 727 (1975).
26. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY (1980). See
generally Eisinger, Black Employment in Municipal Jobs, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 380 (1982)
(discussing impact of black officials on black municipal employment levels); Mladenka,
Comments on Eisinger: Black Employment in Municipal Jobs, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 645 (1982).
27. Address by Fredrick Douglass, Fourth ofJuly Oration, 1852, reprinted in M. LEVY,
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 201 (1982).
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II. Lessons From School Desegregation
We can start to understand the effects of cumulative inequalities
of race, class, and power by looking at the apparently contradictory
evidence on the consequences of school desegregation. Many as-
sert, with voluminous documentation, that it has failed; others pro-
duce just as many footnotes to show its success. The evidence,
however, is only apparently contradictory. Read correctly, it yields
consistent, theoretically sensible, and broadly illuminating results.
In brief, school desegregation succeeds when it is done well and
fails when it is done poorly. Stated thus baldly, the new perspective
hardly seems novel. But it is a startlingly uncommon view and its
ramifications are surprisingly powerful. 28
Why seek to desegregate schools, given the extraordinary opposi-
tion to "forced busing"? 29 Because successful school desegregation
benefits virtually all students. Successful desegregation programs
raise academic achievement of low-scoring (mainly black) students
without harming high-scoring (mainly white) students. They ease
race relations and reduce racial stereotyping by both races, as well
as enhance community morale, increase parents' involvement in the
schools, and minimize or even reverse white flight. The jolt of de-
segregation enables schools to make structural and pedagogical
changes previously stalled for political, bureaucratic, or other rea-
sons. It brings new money, equipment, tutors, and other resources
into the schools. In the long run, successful desegregation im-
proves black students' job and college opportunities, increases
blacks' likelihood of success in integrated environments, and
teaches whites that they share both responsibility for and benefits of
racial interaction.
Abstracting from these particular results, a successful school de-
segregation plan begins to break down the cumulative inequalities
of race, class, and power. It begins, that is, to carry out the promises
of liberal democracy for all. By bringing blacks and whites into mu-
tually respectful contact and by treating all students in similar ways,
28. SeeJ. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4 at 46-91, 177-190.
29. My conclusions do not grow out of an examination of particular plans in identifi-
able school districts. Rather they emerge from an evaluation of policy variables com-
mon to many cases. Thus, across many districts I have examined the academic and
social consequences of the different ages at which children are desegregated, and then
the consequences of different tracking systems within schools, and then the conse-
quences of. . . And so on. This mode of analysis produces a composite picture of
excellent and terrible desegregation plans, against which particular plans of identifiable
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good plans exchange racism for individualism. By channeling re-
sources to poor schools and broadening the horizons of poor stu-
dents, successful plans equalize opportunities and diminish class
barriers. By increasing black influence in white society and involv-
ing parents in the schools, good plans enhance political equality and
reduce power disparities. Above all, successfully desegregated
schools take rights seriously, and confront head-on the normative
conflict between liberal democracy for some and liberal democracy
for all.
Why, then, does mandatory desegregation have such a bad repu-
tation? Because poorly handled plans harm most students as much
as they help them. The worst plans do nothing for achievement and
resegregate within school buildings through tracking, special educa-
tion placement, and discriminatory discipline. Flawed desegrega-
tion increases both races' hostility, exacerbates white flight, and
demotes black teachers and administrators. It undercuts neighbor-
hood schools, which both races prefer, arbitrarily burdens some citi-
zens (mostly blacks and poor whites), and gives poor whites more
reason to nurse racial and class hostilities. Severely flawed plans
sometimes humiliate blacks and reinforce whites' sense of superior-
ity, and they destroy one of the few black power bases - black
schools - without providing any replacement.
Thus, unsuccessful desegregation plans reinforce cumulative ine-
qualities and move the United States further from liberal democracy
for all. By strengthening racial stereotypes and discrimination,
flawed plans inhibit individualism. By maintaining the connections
between parents' economic advantage and children's educational
and further economic advantage, flawed plans undermine equal op-
portunity. By promoting dominance by white elites and undermin-
ing poor white and black communities, flawed plans flout popular
sovereignty and political equality. They give an unsavory reputation
to the whole effort to extend the grant of rights, and they increase
(presumptively illegitimate) governmental interference without pro-
viding compensating benefits. In short, badly handled desegrega-
tion plans undermine the practice of liberal democracy for some and
do nothing to extend it to all.
We now know, fortunately, more than what desegregation can do;
we also have guidelines for how to do it well. Research shows good
results when, in the process of physical desegregation:
* all grades, especially the youngest children, are desegregated
quickly after the plan is mandated;
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* the plan includes all of a district, and preferably a metropoli-
tan region;
* the plan mixes socioeconomic strata as well as races;
* the schools make every possible effort to include well-off and
powerful whites as well as poor and powerless blacks and
whites, so long as they do not "give away the farm";
* school officials, local politicians, and community leaders seri-
ously try to implement the plan well, even if they dislike it;
* school faculty and staff are desegregated;
* the schools receive extra resources from public and private
sources; and
* parents and other community members play important, not
just symbolic, roles in implementing the plan.
Changes in the content of education are just as important as
changes in the racial composition of schools and classrooms.
Schools should:
" limit tracking, special education, and "pull-outs" to those
subjects and students who really require separate help;
* increase cooperative group work within and between
classrooms;
* enhance extracurricular activities and nonacademic subjects,
and ensure that they are desegregated;
" design and enforce clear and fair disciplinary codes after rig-
orously eliminating all violence and threat of violence;
* train teachers to avoid racially-based expectations;
* change the school's identity through (preferably par-
ticipatory) invention of new slogans and other symbols;
* explicitly address racial differences and tensions, sometimes
but not only through routinized discussion forums; and
* fully incorporate multiethnic educational programs into all
students' curricula.
Again abstracting from the particulars, we see that school deseg-
regation succeeds in breaking down cumulative inequalities if the
desegregation program cuts across racial, class, and power lines. In
one sense, this finding is tautologous: school desegregation reduces
cumulative inequalities if it reduces cumulative inequalities. A more
profound truth lurks here, though. To achieve the result of breaking
down cumulative inequalities, a desegregation policy must use a pro-
cess that treats blacks and whites, rich and poor, influential and pow-
erless, alike.
Alternatively and more strongly, it must use a process that grants
resources or access to resources to poor and powerless blacks and
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whites at the expense of wealthy and powerful whites. Almost all
features of a good desegregation plan directly attack racial stereo-
types and discrimination, require the wealthy to share their re-
sources and privileges, and give more power to the heretofore
powerless. As participatory democrats used to say, only the right
action now will yield the right outcome later.
In parallel fashion, school desegregation generates few benefits
and many harms for both races when it maintains cumulative ine-
qualities. More precisely, it fails when:
" the plan transports only a few children (generally black), de-
segregates only a few grades, and/or appears to be tempo-
rary and easily changed;
" the plan pairs contiguous poor black and white
neighborhoods;
" the middle class of both races easily evades the program, or
middle class schools and students receive all the new re-
sources and incentives;
" the plan simply creates a few magnet schools without improv-
ing the remaining schools (unless the district is very small
and mainly white);
* teaching, counseling, extracurricular, and disciplinary pat-
terns do not change to accommodate the new children;
* political leaders and educators do not seriously try to cajole
their constituency and to implement changes; and
* within the school system, power remains in the hands of the
(generally white) "old guard".
One can anticipate the moral of this story by now: plans that re-
tain old racial, economic, and political structures yield desegrega-
tion programs that reinforce discrimination, unequal opportunity,
and political inequality. The logic here is exactly symmetrical to the
logic of good desegregation plans. Inequality-reinforcing policies
generate inequality-reinforcing results.
Given that we now know how to desegregate schools, it is at first
glance surprising that horror stories predominate over success sto-
ries. The explanation, however, is implicit in the analysis. Major
reforms are resisted because they disrupt existing structures and
previously settled normative choices.3 0 Many citizens, even those
30. Two additional reasons for the scarcity of successful desegregation plans are im-
portant but tangential to my theoretical concern here. First, only recently have re-
searchers examined desegregation success and failure by aggregating studies of many
policy actions across many districts. This method has made the literature on school de-
segregation dramatically more useful; five years ago, most of the findings which I sum-
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whose children might benefit, accept the status quo or fear change.
Similarly, many liberal democratic values would have to be reformu-
lated or weighted differently for desegregation to work as it should.
Consider the first obstacle to successful desegregation. Many ed-
ucators stand to lose in a desegregation plan that in the long run
benefits most students. Teachers must change pedagogical styles,
clientele, and even workplaces. Administrators must make room for
new faces and take on new responsibilities, often imposed by an ex-
ternal and arguably illegitimate authority such as a court or federal
agency. School board members and political officials must stand for
reelection against newly popular anti-busing candidates. Rich
schools must yield resources to poor schools and must divert atten-
tion from successful (usually white and middle class) to unsuccessful
(often black and poor) students. In short, settled patterns of inter-
action, reflecting assumed relations of economic, social, and polit-
ical hierarchy, must change. All of these "penalties" are borne even
by educators who are not personally prejudiced and who endorse
integration. And, of course, racism may well exist, particularly
among those who have recently been found guilty of de jure
segregation.
White parents oppose even more than educators many of the very
changes yielding the best results for both races. Desegregating the
youngest students, desegregating quickly, transporting children
across city-suburban school district lines, transporting whites as well
as blacks, minimizing tracking, encouraging cooperative work across
ability groups, moving teachers and administrators, granting power-
ful positions to nonwhites, withholding resources and many of the
best staffers from magnet schools for the gifted and talented, di-
recting more tax dollars to the poorest students, schools and dis-
tricts, changing the traditional image of formerly-white schools, and
marized above literally did not exist except on an ad hoc, usually case-by-case, basis.
These findings are not at all self-evident, and educators could certainly not have been
expected to stumble upon all the right methods for designing and implementing their
plans. Nor could they have sustained unpopular methods without powerful justifica-
tions, which systematic evidence of success provides. School desegregation provides
excellent evidence for the claim that given enough time, researchers, and resources,
social science can make sense of a very messy and diffuse problem.
Desegregation plans also fail because of typical problems with policy innovation and
implementation. Schools, after all, are large, complex bureaucracies with features that
make institutional change difficult to begin and more difficult to maintain and control.
These features include long histories, a loose coupling between top and bottom, budget
constraints, street-level bureaucrats, and political sensitivities. Add the fact that school
systems traditionally have not wanted to desegregate and still seek to minimize interven-
tion by outsiders, and the question becomes more aptly, "Why do schools make any
reforms?" rather than "Why don't schools make enough reforms?"
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teaching white students black perspectives as much as vice versa -
all of these changes are anathema to many white parents, yet all are
needed for desegregation to benefit children of both races. 3' The
argument is becoming repetitive: necessary changes disrupt old so-
cial, economic, and political practices which have, on average,
benefitted whites more than blacks. We should not be surprised
that whites are reluctant to give them up.3 2
In short, educators and white parents object to features of school
desegregation that challenge racial views and practices, change the
power structure in schools, or disrupt the normal rewards of eco-
nomic standing. Only one means can produce desegregation suc-
cess despite such opposition: policymakers must largely ignore
citizens' and implementors' preferences in designing and imple-
menting plans. This unfortunate conclusion follows directly and
logically from the points just made. If most school officials and par-
ents do not choose to disrupt their own lives, if "street-level" pro-
ponents of change are relatively few and powerless, and if successful
desegregation is to occur, then it must be imposed from above.
For once, evidence follows logic. Not all desegregation plans or-
dered by courts or the Office for Civil Rights have succeeded, but
almost all successful plans have been mandated by unelected offi-
cials. 33 Federal courts and bureaucrats have taken on the most diffi-
31. Black parents also increasingly oppose school desegregation, at least as it is usu-
ally implemented. Too often their children are bused out of their neighborhood to
mainly white schools. There they are placed in heavily black lower tracks or stigmatizing
"pull-out" programs administered by whites who often do not want their new students.
Meanwhile, black faculty and staff lose their positions or at least importance, black
schools no longer function as community centers, and black parents confront a psycho-
logically, culturally, and physically distant environment. Blacks increasingly argue that
the purpose of school desegregation is better education, not racial integration per se,
and that good separate schooling is preferable to poor, formally (but not actually) de-
segregated schooling if they must make a choice. For evidence and arguments, see J.
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 160-168 and sources cited therein; J. HOCHSCHILD, THIRTY
YEARS AMTER BROWN 20-22, 26-28, and 40 (1985); D. BELL, SHADES OF BROWN (1980);
and Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470-516 (1976). Black skepticism about school desegregation,
however, is strictly speaking irrelevant to my analysis, since most blacks probably would
support desegregation that is done well. Thus blacks' current preferences do not pres-
ent a conflict between desegregation success and ultimate citizen preference.
32. To reiterate: most whites do not see their own position as privileged in compari-
son to that of blacks. Similarly, most whites can correctly argue that they have done
nothing personally either to oppress blacks or to benefit directly from blacks' oppres-
sion. Nevertheless, whites are, on average, better off than blacks and, arguably, whites'
relatively great wealth and power is at least partly due to blacks' long history of relative
poverty and powerlessness. The fact that whites have not directly participated in the
creation of, and do not see, their own relative privilege, makes such privilege that much
harder to give up.
33. SeeJ. HOCHsCHILD, supra note 4, at 131-144. I say "almost" here because elected
officials have promulgated a few successful desegregation plans. Most such cases, how-
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cult cases (southern districts first, northern cities later), imposed the
most sweeping changes in school practices (such as a new reading
program in Detroit), transferred the most resources to poor schools
and poor districts (as in Detroit and St. Louis), and worked hardest
to equalize the burdens of busing across races and classes (as in St.
Louis and Charlotte, North Carolina).
The outcomes of authoritatively ordered plans are as clearly
superior as the processes. Only unelected officials have ordered
metropolitan-wide plans that come out best on all measures of de-
segregation success. Plans ordered by courts and agencies have im-
proved race relations (for example, in Charlotte and Louisville),
increased academic achievement of black students (as in Charlotte
and Boston), minimized second-generation discrimination (as in
Cleveland), and given powerful positions to blacks (as in Cleveland
and Boston).
The unsettling finding that successful desegregation must largely
ignore citizens' views challenges not only preferred political prac-
tices but also cherished norms. This point recalls the second and
more profoundly disturbing obstacle to desegregation success. To
grant all citizens liberal democracy's promise of the right freely to
live as one wishes, school desegregation must reformulate many lib-
eral democratic norms or reorder their usual priorities.
Successful school desegregation violates the normal understand-
ing of property rights by redistributing property tax receipts, by re-
quiring rich as well as poor to participate, and by requiring even
those who have moved to the suburbs, arguably to escape this whole
situation, to participate. For the same reasons, it violates canons of
local autonomy and self-governance. Good plans challenge individ-
ualism and meritocracy for teachers and staff by differentially re-
warding ascriptive traits, and for students by questioning ability
grouping, special programs for the gifted and talented, and compar-
ative evaluations. Successful desegregation questions the right of
free association by mandating desegregated social and extracurricu-
lar activities. It violates the democratic norm of popular sovereignty
by calling for authoritative imposition of unpopular, even hated,
new policies. To ensure that all citizens may partake of liberal dem-
ocratic values, school desegregation must violate some citizens' un-
ever, have unusual features or can be fit into my framework. Several are atypically lib-
eral college towns, such as Berkeley, California or Princeton, New Jersey. Others have
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derstanding and exercise of those values. Little wonder that it does
not often do so, and never fully does so.
Examining the elements of successful school desegregation shows
the baneful effects of cumulative inequalities, and focuses our atten-
tion on the dangers for liberal democracy of those inequalities. Ad-
dressing only problems of race - merely busing to achieve racial
balance across schools - fails because it ignores the consequences
of poverty and powerlessness for both blacks and whites. But ad-
dressing all three dimensions at once - redistributing educational
resources and power along with children - threatens long-standing
social, economic, and political hierarchies. The appropriately wide
view also threatens our norms in the name of extending those
norms, a politically and normatively difficult position at best. My
prognosis for success in school desegregation is poor.
III. Analogies With Affirmative Action and Public Housing
Is school desegregation unique? Has our nation, by some ex-
traordinary turn of legal and historical bad luck, spent so much en-
ergy on the single most intractable policy for granting the promises
of liberal democracy to all citizens? I would be glad to answer
"yes"; that answer would imply that the United States has spent
thirty years barking up the wrong tree, but it would also imply the
existence of other trees in the forest which could yield a more satis-
fying harvest. Unfortunately, school desegregation is not unique.
Other desegregation policies follow the same empirical pattern and
have the same normative logic.
Consider, for example, affirmative action in employment. It usu-
ally suffers from the same single-minded focus on race as most
school desegregation plans. Too often affirmative action policies
simply give an extra boost to blacks who have the resources to suc-
ceed on their own. Elite colleges and professional schools admit the
children of black doctors and politicians; employers hire black grad-
uates of elite colleges and professional schools. 34 Thus well-off
34. The director of financial aid at Yale University, for example, recently said, "[olur
kinds of schools are not gambling as much on lower-income and lower-ability students.
As a result, we are ending up with a somewhat higher socioeconomic profile. Probably a
lot of schools were more inclined to make exceptions to normal standards of admissions
for low-income minority students when they first adopted affirmative action programs in
the late 1960's and early 1970's." See Nix, Inner City, Elite Campus: How 2 Worlds Jar, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
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blacks become better off, and poor and powerless blacks remain at
the bottom of the heap alongside poor and powerless whites.35
The point is not that well-off and well-connected blacks do not
face discrimination; they do. But they have more weapons to com-
bat it than poor and powerless blacks have, while would-be black
workers who most need a boost are most often passed over by em-
ployers. 36 Furthermore, I am not arguing for abolition of even
badly targeted affirmative action programs. Discrimination persists,
and the handicapping effects of previous discrimination may cer-
tainly endure. So even this limited form of redress probably does
more good than harm.3 7 Nevertheless, our single-minded focus on
race, to the exclusion of serious inequities of class and power, gen-
erates a policy that does little to benefit those blacks who need it
most and does a lot to anger those whites who also suffer from eco-
nomic and political inequity.
Because the employment problem is more than racial, any effec-
tive solution to it must range wider than most affirmative action pro-
35. Alternatively, working class and lower-middle class blacks receive preference for
jobs in police departments and social agencies. This practice gives blacks a badly-
needed entry into the workforce, but it denies that entry to an equally needy white who
probably has not directly participated in, or indirectly gained much from, centuries of
racial discrimination. I find this level of affirmative action much more normatively ac-
ceptable than the elite level, but it is at least as politically controversial.
Here too, the interaction of race, class, and power can be blamed for much of the
frustration, since people who are equally needy and powerless spend their energies on
antagonism toward the other race rather than unifying against the wealthy and powerful,
or comforting each other over the vagaries of fate, or otherwise recognizing that their
similarities outweigh their differences. SeeJ. REIDER, supra note 2, at 95-131 for a sensi-
tive discussion of white working class sentiments about affirmative action.
36. A more argumentative version of this point would claim that rich and powerful
blacks need less help than poor and powerless whites. According to this view, affirma-
tive action policy should address class and power disparities more than (or even instead
of) racial ones. I do not make this claim for two reasons. First, I am unsure empirically
whether any given poor white is worse off than any given rich black, and I know no way
to determine the validity of the point. Second, to claim that class or power disparities
are worse than racial ones is to violate the basic premise of this article - that the combi-
nation of inequities is the critical problem, so it does not matter which of the three inde-
pendently is more serious than the other two.
37. I say "probably" here because of two powerful arguments against affirmative
action. If white opposition to it is (or becomes) strong enough, affirmative action poli-
cies could actually exacerbate and spread the racism that they are intended to amelio-
rate. This argument is not at all compelling morally or legally, but it is pragmatically.
Furthermore, if blacks themselves come to believe that affirmative action policies
demonstrate or create the fact of black inferiority, then such policies may do more harm
than good. For thoughtful critiques of affirmative action, see Howard & Hammond, Ru-
mors of Inferiority, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1885, at 17-21; Murray, Affirmative Racism,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18-23; Address by Glenn Loury, The Crisis in Black
America (National Press Club, Washington, D.C.) (Dec. 17, 1985); and Jencks, supra note
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grams do. Formally opening employment possibilities to all,
analogous to abolishing dejure school segregation, is necessary but
insufficient to end racial disparities in employment and promotion.
Voluntary measures consisting of exhortation and good intentions
yield about as much change as "free choice" policies for school as-
signments. The next step, analogous to redrawing school bounda-
ries and mandating transportation to correct racial imbalance, is
setting requirements for hiring and promoting blacks. Such a
"quota" system is about as popular and successful as "forced bus-
ing." And most important for my purposes, the two policies are un-
popular and unsuccessful for similar reasons.
Both policies are unpopular because they downplay some liberal
democratic values in favor of others. Quotas violate popular sover-
eignty, defined here as whites' preferences about where and how
they will work and who they will hire and promote. Quotas imposed
by courts or agencies challenge the liberal belief in minimal govern-
ment intervention in private economic decisions. They gainsay indi-
vidualism and equal opportunity for some, since ascriptive criteria
are used to deny a presumably innocent white ajob or promotion he
(seldom she) might have merited by skill or seniority. 38 Finally,
quota systems violate liberal property rights by requiring employers
to take actions they otherwise would not take.
Busing and quotas are typically unsuccessful as well as unpopular
because, as described above, they both produce perverse conse-
quences. Here the analogy between affirmative action and school
desegregation becomes complicated because class and power have
opposite effects in the two cases. In school busing, the poor and
powerless of both races are disproportionately expected to partici-
pate; in affirmative action, well-off and powerful blacks are dispro-
portionately permitted to participate. Thus busing makes the badly-
off worse off, whereas affirmative action makes the well-off better
off. In both cases, however, inequalities accumulate because both
policies take into account only one facet of a multi-faceted structure.
The solutions to the problems of strict affirmative action and
mandatory school desegregation are, once again, analogous. Job
desegregation must tackle inequalities of race, class, and power si-
multaneously in order to extend the promises of liberal democracy
to all. At a minimum, affirmative action policies should target poor
38. See, e.g., Fullinwider, The AT&T Case and Affirmative Action, 177-179 in ETHIcs AND
POLITICS (A. Gutman & D. Thompson eds. 1984). This case is interesting because,
among other reasons, it involved affirmative hiring of men for jobs traditionally held by
women.
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and powerless blacks. An intermediate step would ensure that the
new employees receive positions of real power and substantial re-
muneration. At a maximum, Americans should change their social
structure enough for affirmative action to be no longer necessary.
If blacks received as good an education as whites, grew up with as
many routes out of their childhood world, had as many role models
and job contacts, were as mobile or had as many job opportunities
near their homes, had as many incentives and as much guidance to
develop middle class work habits, and were not seen by (mostly
white) employers as potential troublemakers or detractions to cli-
ents, then blacks' chances for success through employment and pro-
motion would equal whites'. For those things to happen, though,
blacks must have the same social, economic, and political status as
whites. That will not happen if currently wealthy and powerful ben-
eficiaries of the status quo, as well as people who simply fear
change, have anything to say about the matter. We have arrived by
a different road at the same destination we reached through school
desegregation.
Consider as a final analogy to school desegregation the issue of
residential integration. Open housing laws, like open employment
policies and the abolition of dejure school segregation, are necessary
but insufficient. Urging white communities to seek (especially low-
income) black neighbors is, as with exhortation about schools and
jobs, praiseworthy but largely ineffective. Public housing for poor
blacks in middle class white suburbs is just as unpopular and unsuc-
cessful as forced busing or hiring quotas. It, too, runs counter to
whites' preferences, arguably violates whites' property rights, in-
volves considerable governmental intervention in private lives, and
ignores the ways that class and power combine with race to shape
people's behaviors.
For a policy of mandated housing integration to succeed (that is,
for the new neighbors to accept each other psychologically and so-
cially, and for the neighborhood to have enough blacks to avoid
tokenism but not so many that whites flee), blacks must have the
same economic and political means and perhaps the same social mo-
res as their white neighbors. But, in general, they do not; we return
to the basic problem of cumulative inequalities. Policies to promote
housing integration cannot succeed unless they address the class
and power dimensions of residential segregation by race.
This brief treatment of affirmative action and public housing is
intended only to suggest that the underlying obstacles to successful
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school desegregation are not unique to schools. Other race policies
have the same structure. Because inequalities of race, class, and
power cumulate, policies that address only racial discrimination are
too weak to succeed, and policies strong enough to address all three
dimensions are too unpopular to be sustained long enough. Their
unpopularity is not difficult to explain: policies powerful enough to
overcome cumulative inequalities and grant liberal democratic
rights to all must violate or redefine the liberal democratic rights of
some.
IV. Remedies
The way out of this tangle of unfortunate circumstances and un-
fulfilled promises is not obvious. The problem of cumulative ine-
qualities in a liberal democracy may finally be insoluble. Even if
solutions are not attainable, however, improvements are certainly
possible. After all, the United States has already significantly less-
ened and loosened the cumulative inequalities of race, class, and
power; it can do so further. Existential despair is no excuse for
inaction.
Some evidence suggests grounds for encouragement. Once peo-
ple experience desegregation, their opposition declines considera-
bly. This finding is as surprising as it is consistent. The same survey
respondents who reject "forced busing" as an abstract possibility
are very satisfied with it after their children have been bused.A9 As
high school desegregation spread in the 1970s, more college fresh-
men endorsed busing, with support rising from just over one-third
in 1976 to over one-half in 1985.40 Cities, universities, and corpora-
tions that have implemented affirmative action plans now resist ef-
forts by the federal government to dismantle their plans.4"
39. Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, supra note 6, at 38-40; Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCI-
ATEs, Majority of Parents Report School Busing Has Been Satisfactory Experience, Press Release
No. 25 (Mar. 26, 1981); Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, Black Voting the Key to Outcome in
1984, Press Release No. 58 (July 21, 1983).
40. COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., THE
AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS 55 (A. Astin, M. King & G. Richardson, eds.
1976); Id. at 56 (1983); Id. at 58 (1984); Id. at 59 (1985) For additional evidence, seeJ.
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 179-187 and sources cited therein.
41. See, e.g., Engelberg, Attack on Quotas Opposed by Cities, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1985, at
1, col. 1; Barron, Indianapolis Plans to Fight for Its Quota System, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1985, at
B28, col. 1; Davidson, Keep FederalAfrmative Action Strong, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at
A19, col. 2; Robertson, Why Bosses Like to Be Told To Hire Minorities, Wash. Post, Nov. 10,
1985, at D1, col. 4. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see An Interview with Nathan
Glazer, 17 NEW PERSP. 27 (1985).
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It is hard to know how to interpret these results. They may simply
indicate that individuals and organizations always prefer the status
quo to change, whether because they fear the unknown or because
change is inefficient and disruptive. Alternatively, the results may
reflect self-selection bias; individuals and organizations willing to
undergo busing and quotas may be those who endorsed or at least
accepted mandated integration initially. A third interpretation is
that school desegregation and affirmative action simply produced
less change than people anticipated and people have learned to ac-
commodate token reforms.
However, the best interpretation may be more hopeful. Once the
promises of liberal democracy are extended to previously excluded
blacks, whites may discover that their fears were not realized and
their hopes were. Whites may learn that feeling racially superior is
unnecessary for self-esteem, that black leaders can act in the interest
of both races, that economic gains for some do not necessarily mean
economic losses for others, and that getting along with blacks is
more productive and more fun than hating them. They may learn,
in short, that the problem of cumulative inequalities in a liberal de-
mocracy is a problem of transition costs rather than zero-sum
games.
If the hopeful interpretation of these surprising data is correct,
the prognosis for racial equality in America is not as gloomy as this
article has implied so far. Apparently some desegregation plans,
though deeply flawed, have proven better than none. After all, ra-
cial differentiation is a problem worth attacking, even if the real
problem is the combination of race, class, and power. Where plans
are in place and seem to be working, or where blacks and whites are
so distant or resources so scarce that racial issues are all they can
handle at the moment, or, above all, where the plan makes a serious
effort to combat economic and political inequalities as well as racial
ones, then policymakers should continue to pursue school desegre-
gation and affirmative action (and perhaps integrated public hous-
ing, although we lack data on its effects). I do not, in short, propose
that we should abandon all previous efforts to combat discrimina-
tion. I am pessimistic about success in most such efforts, but both
evidence 42 and the natural urge to act in the face of a problem rec-
ommend doing something over doing nothing.
42. For evidence on long-term benefits for blacks who attend desegregated schools,
see, e.g., J. HoCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 178-79 and sources cited therein; Braddock,
Crain, & McPartland, A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Gradu-
ates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259 (1984).
326
Vol. 4:307, 1986
Race, Class, and Power
However, the analysis above suggests that we should do more
than simply improve current programs. It points to two prescrip-
tions which seem more useful for the 1980s than most conventional
desegregation plans. Both stem from the earlier observation that
racism explains both too much and too little in seeking to under-
stand opposition to desegregation policies. By analogy, racial inte-
gration is both too strong and too weak a demand to solve
America's problem of race.
The first, rather paradoxical, claim - that racial integration is too
strong a demand to solve the problems of racial separation - grows
out of the first lesson of policymaking. We always face tradeoffs; we
can seldom pursue all good things at once. Therefore civil rights
activists should devote their attention to the worst problems or the
problems most amenable to intervention. In my view, these two
criteria converge in today's political climate on a prescription to de-
emphasize race and concentrate on class and power. 43
More precisely, in some circumstances civil rights advocates
should withdraw from aggressive attempts to help blacks join white
society. The "worst problems" criterion points to the fact that too
many blacks face abysmal schooling, lack of any chance to earn a
living, and entrapment in ghettos that drag their children into fur-
ther poverty and impotence. For them, integration with whites is
perhaps desirable but a luxury that comes well down the list of ur-
gent needs. The "greatest chance for success" criterion points the
same way. In many central city school systems, meaningful desegre-
gation is arithmetically impossible. 44 In some districts, white hostil-
ity, opposition from political leaders, black ambivalence, and a
paucity of resources combine to make any further meaningful de-
segregation extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Under these condi-
tions, policymakers should downplay desegregation per se and
instead directly attack the effects of class and power inequities.
Communities should concentrate on improving school quality re-
gardless of racial composition, creating good jobs even in racially
separate firms, and extending residential options even into black
suburban communities.
43. Twenty-five years ago I probably would have given different advice, since the
most pressing problem then was clearly dejure racial segregation. At present, however,
the problem of racial discrimination per se is much less severe than the problems of
racially-related inequities of class and power.
44. For example, by 1980, public schools in Washington, D.C. had 94 percent black
enrollment; Detroit schools had 86 percent and Atlanta schools 91 percent black stu-
dents. See G. ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-
1980 app. B (1983).
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Thus political leaders should provide minority schools more than
additional funding. Those schools need structural changes to train
and retain good staff and bureaucratic maneuvering room to turn
ineffective black schools into educationally excellent ones. Policy-
makers should ensure that minority families receive mortgages and
perhaps mortgage subsidies, are informed about available houses in
hospitable communities, and are otherwise helped to move into
safe, clean, self-sustaining black neighborhoods. Governments and
private actors should grant black businesses the loans and technical
aid needed to thrive and create new jobs, and should give potential
workers information about and training for those jobs.
My point here is ideological as much as programmatic. Civil
rights advocates should, in some instances, think of high-quality,
black-dominated schools, firms, and neighborhoods as attractive al-
ternatives to mandated integration rather than merely as palliatives
or as a surrender to white resistance. 45 After all, student reassign-
ment by itself may cause more harm than good, whereas high quality
isolated education, though it lacks important virtues, can begin to
break the hold of poverty and powerlessness on black children. A
poorly handled affirmative action program may increase whites'
prejudice without improving blacks' economic chances; conversely,
jobs in black-owned businesses may not advance racial integration
but can make big inroads into poverty and powerlessness. In paral-
lel fashion, mandated neighborhood integration may simply isolate
new entrants and destroy any sense of community; putting public
housing in black suburbs at least gives poor blacks who become resi-
dents a more hospitable environment and increased control over
their own lives.
Nothing in this analysis implies that class and power inequities are
much more tractable than discrimination has proven to be. Poor
black cities and poor black parents will not easily find the resources
to improve schools, create jobs, and arrest the sickening dissolution
of family and community strength about which we have recently
heard so much. Nevertheless, cumulative inequalities may best be
attacked in the 1980's by deemphasizing integration and strength-
ening demands for economic and political change within black com-
45. Many black civil rights leaders such as Derrick Bell and organizations such as the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. now espouse this position. I do not present it as any-
thing new; rather, my point is that what these actors promote for reasons of political
expediency and moral outrage also makes sense from the perspective of democratic the-
ory and structural analysis. See generally D. BELL, supra note 32; Toobin, After Integration,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1985, at 22, 23.
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munities. More pragmatically, this prescription takes full advantage
of the increasing number of black mayors. They may have a better
chance to wrest needed resources from the wealthier white society if
they use those resources to help black schools, firms, and neighbor-
hoods than if they use them to "encroach" further on the lives of
white constituents.
My other prescription for ameliorating cumulative inequalities
suggests that the demand for racial integration is sometimes too
weak because it narrows the policy agenda too much. Instead of
focusing on divisive racial issues, blacks and whites should unite
around a broad array of policy demands to lessen class and power
inequalities for both races.46
For example, the problem of unemployment crosses racial lines.
Regardless of race, unemployed or discouraged workers and their
families, jobless teens, and female heads of households would all
benefit from policies to increase the number, quality, and remunera-
tion of jobs. Similarly, blacks and whites have mutual interests in
developing local communities that are safe, pleasant, and responsive
to families' needs. Infant care and after-school care, crime control,
renovation of deteriorating buildings and public spaces - these is-
sues could unite racially distinct neighborhoods as policies to inte-
grate neighborhoods seldom can. Even school crises can bring
black and white working class parents together in an alliance against
mediocre education and apparently indifferent administrators. The
black plaintiff in the St. Louis school desegregation case and the
white founder of the anti-busing group became close friends once
they discovered their shared desire for better schools; they and their
respective followers began to sit together in court, disconcerting
lawyers and school personnel alike. 47
Like the former, this prescription is hardly new, as it echoes the
old socialist dream of overcoming racial differences by uniting work-
ers around common class interests. Old ideas are often the best.
Alliances might replace divisions if reformers sought to improve
schools, create jobs, and enhance neighborhoods rather than seek-
ing to change their membership.
This prescription is no more a panacea than the first one. After
all, the old socialist dream was never realized. No one can guaran-
46. My thanks to Theda Skocpol for starting my thinking along these lines and for
examples of specific policies.
47. The convoluted history of this litigation is recounted in Liddell v. Missouri, 731
F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984); Liddell v. Board of
Educ., 758 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1985).
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tee that blacks will not once again end up on the bottom of the heap,
or that new resources and powers will be forthcoming for the poor
and impotent of any race. Once again, to ask for a panacea is to ask
for too much; it makes the temptation to give up in despair too
great. Instead, recognizing the problem as one of cumulative ine-
qualities rather than race per se gives us a framework in which to
broaden the agenda for reform and to escape the zero-sum dynam-
ics of racism.
Thus the very breadth of the problem of cumulative inequalities
of race, class, and power may be grounds for hope as well as for
despair. Because the problem has so many dimensions, it may be
possible to address some directly and thereby approach others indi-
rectly. The ideal policy, as the history of school desegregation
shows, attacks all three dimensions of inequality at once. My pri-
mary prescription grows out of that history: more change not only
is better than less but also corrects some of the harms that less
change creates. But seldom are prescriptions for ideal policies put
into practice. If the primary prescription is unattainable, three
others follow from this analysis.
First, in some circumstances partial desegregation is better than
none. No general rule can specify all such cases, but surely a flawed
reform is sometimes still a worthwhile reform. Second, in some cir-
cumstances abandoning desegregation in favor of improving the
economic and political position of isolated blacks is the best avail-
able choice. Third, in some circumstances ignoring desegregation
in favor of unifying poor and powerless blacks and whites around
common interests is the most fruitful strategy.
All three prescriptions lack the virtues of the first, ideal, one. The
flaws of conventional desegregation are serious; policies to benefit
blacks will not promote desegregation at least in the short run, and
policies to help the working poor will not help all blacks. On bal-
ance, at this point in our history and with some critical exceptions,
the two indirect approaches to racial equality seem preferable to the
flawed direct one if that is the array of available choices. Perhaps
focusing less on race and more on class and power will, in the long
run, better enable all Americans to live as well as some Americans
now do.
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